Reconstructing the Presidential Electoral System after the Abolition of the Presidential Threshold: Implications of Constitutional Court Decision on Indonesia's Multi-Party System

Abstract

This study critically examines how the abolition reconfigures the institutional architecture of Indonesia's multi-party presidential system, analyzes the shift in the Constitutional Court's legal reasoning underlying the decision, and evaluates the extent to which the ruling resonates with the Islamic legal principle of al-musawah (equality) read together with al-'adl (justice) and maslahah (public benefit). Employing normative legal research through statutory, historical, and conceptual approaches, complemented by an Islamic legal (fiqh siyasah) approach to primary Islamic sources, the study finds that removing the threshold expands political inclusiveness and procedural equality in presidential nomination, yet simultaneously heightens the risk of candidate proliferation, coalition fragmentation, and reduced governability that must be anticipated through redesigned electoral mechanisms. The Constitutional Court's reasoning reflects a doctrinal shift from treating the threshold as an open legal policy to subjecting it to strict constitutional review once it burdens political rights. From an Islamic legal perspective, al-musawah justifies equal nomination opportunity, but must be balanced against maslahah, so that equality of access does not come at the expense of governmental effectiveness. This study argues that abolishing the presidential threshold requires not merely legislative harmonization, but a broader institutional redesign that reconciles political inclusiveness with a functioning multi-party presidential system.